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In Rhode Island government administration, each state
agency is responsible for its own dispute resolution hearing proce-
dure. Agency control over this procedure creates several issues
and conflicts discussed throughout this Comment. In response to
these issues, Rhode Island should create a Central Hearing
Agency (CHA).1 This CHA would have the sole responsibility of
providing independent hearing officers to adjudicate administra-
tive disputes between state agencies and citizens. 2
Similar to a judge, a hearing officer 3 evaluates written evi-
dence, listens to testimony, and, when necessary, makes factual
determinations. 4 A hearing officer's decision may involve the revo-
cation of a license or the imposition of a substantial fine, and is
likely to have a significant impact on an individual or entity in-
volved in an administrative dispute.5 Therefore, like a judge, a
hearing officer should be an independent party, free from underly-
ing bias and influences.
Rhode Island's current procedure closely resembles the tradi-
tional judicial process, 6 absent one key element: a neutral third-
party decision-maker. The hearing officer, appointed to adjudicate
agency cases, is an employee of that same agency. 7 Additionally,
1. The nomenclature for an independent state agency that has a sole re-
sponsibility of providing administrative adjudication varies from state to
state. Names such as "Central Hearing Panel," "Central Panel," and "Office of
Administrative Hearings" (OAH) are also used. Central Hearing Agency
(CHA) will be used hereinafter, except when discussing a specific state's
agency.
2. Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75, 76 (1994).
3. Hearing officers are also referred to as "hearing examiners" and "ad-
ministrative law judges" (ALJ) in different states.
4. Norman Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California
View, 29 ADMIN. L. REv. 487, 487-88 (1977).
5. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 75-76.
6. See Frederick Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The
Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977
DUKE L.J. 389, 389 (1977); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Administrative Adjudication
Total Quality Management: The Only Way to Reduce Costs and Delays with-
out Sacrificing Due Process, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGE 5, 5 (1995)
("[Administrative law adjudications have come to resemble judicial branch
adjudications.").
7. These Hearing Officers consider state administrative matters involv-
ing licensing affairs, taxes, health issues, environmental management, em-
ployment and labor affairs, among other subjects. Hoberg, supra note 2, at
76; see also Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central
ADMINISTRATIVE INJUSTICE
the agency's director reviews, and may modify or reject, the deci-
sion of the subordinate hearing officer. This employment relation-
ship and director review potentially creates an underlying bias,
thereby tainting the fairness of the process.8 Even if a fair hearing
is provided, the current process generates the appearance of im-
propriety in the eyes of the legal community and of Rhode Island
citizens. 9 The result of bias and the appearance of impropriety
creates an inefficient and costly administrative adjudication proc-
ess which may backlog the Rhode Island courts. 10 Because of con-
cerns involving real and perceived fairness, half of the states have
already changed their administrative hearing processes and cre-
ated autonomous hearing agencies.' These states now have need-
based CHA systems that vary in jurisdiction, authority and fund-
ing.
To arrive at a potential solution for Rhode Island, Parts I and
II will examine the concept of a CHA, and compare and contrast
existing CHA systems. Part II will also address arguments against
the implementation of a CHA. Part III will scrutinize the tradi-
tional administrative hearing process and its inherent difficulties.
Part IV more specifically will analyze Rhode Island's current proc-
ess. Finally, Part IV additionally will recommend that Rhode Is-
land implement a CHA. Rhode Island's CHA should have broad
jurisdiction requiring most, if not all, state agencies to use CHA
hearing officers. Like any other state agency, the CHA should re-
ceive its budget from Rhode Island's general fund. Lastly, the
CHA hearing officer's decision should continue to be subject to the
final approval of the substantive agency's director.
Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53
ADMIN. L. REv. 475, 479 (2001).
8. See David W. Heynderickx, Finding Middle Ground: Oregon Experi-
ments with a Central Hearing Panel for Contested Case Proceedings, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 224 (2000); see also Hon. John W. Hardwicke, The
Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 425
(2001).
9. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 76; Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 225-
26.
10. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 76-77; Heynderickx, supra note 8, at
227.
11. See Hardwicke, supra note 8, at 420, 422. California was the first to
implement a CHA in 1945. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 77; see also Abrams, su-
pra note 4, at 49; Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System; A Study
of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE 246, 249 (1981).
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I. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESSES
The method of state administrative adjudication within the
United States is in the midst of an evolution. 12 Among the states,
there are currently two different approaches: 1) the traditional
approach which leaves the procedure in the hands of each agency;
and 2) a centralized hearing agency model. In states without a
CHA, each agency is "charged with investigating, prosecuting, and
adjudicating cases involving citizens they regulate."13 This tradi-
tional approach leaves the hearing procedure, including the ap-
pointment of a hearing officer, in the hands of the agency - the
same agency that has a vested interest in the outcome of the hear-
ing.14 The agency's dual role of policy advocate and referee creates
a conflict of interest and other problems. 15 Many states have re-
sponded by implementing a CHA.16
As one scholar observes, "itlhe judicialization of the adminis-
trative process, a phenomenon largely taken for granted by both
lawyers and the general public in contemporary America, is
probably one of the most mysterious, yet significant, features of
American government." 7 In the past, the role of an administrative
hearing officer was ministerial in nature and had little bearing on
the final outcome of the issue.18 Throughout history, the hearing
officer's role evolved because "judges increasingly took the position
that certain types of governmental actions would not be sustained
unless the agency itself had extended to the adversely affected
parties' procedural protection akin to... notice and opportunity to
be heard." 9 Because of the judicial nature of the hearing officer's
role, the person fulfilling that position should be, like a judge, in-
dependent and free from conflict.
12. See Hardwicke, supra note 8, at 419-20 ("[Tihe central panel move-
ment within the states is a multi-faceted achievement.").
13. Felter, supra note 6, at 5.
14. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 224 ("[Tjhe agency is allowed to act as
police officer, prosecutor, and judge, with the hearing process a mere rubber
stamp for the agency staffs decision.").
15. These problems will be discussed in detail infra.
16. McNeil, supra note 7, at 476-77.
17. Davis, supra note 6, at 389.
18. See id. at 392.
19. Goldsmith v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 126 (1926).
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II. THE CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY
A CHA provides a forum for state government dispute resolu-
tion that is independent, impartial and efficient. 20 The Chief
Judge for the Division of Administrative Hearings in Colorado de-
scribes a CHA's function as follows:
Unlike de-centralized [hearing officers], housed in the
agencies they serve, independent central panels are
geared to one mission only - adjudication. In a nutshell,
the only business of a central panel . . . is to hear and de-
cide cases - not to occasionally serve as in-house counsel
for an agency or in other legal capacities. Not only do cen-
tral panels have a vested interest in being efficient and
cost effective, they must because they are under a micro-
scope focused on adjudications - to the exclusion of other
tasks.21
Where a CHA has been established, segregation of the deci-
sion-maker from the agency has led to the creation of an equitable
forum, the appearance of impartiality, a reduced burden on both
state courts and agencies, a uniform system of state administra-
tive justice, and a reduction in overall costs. 22 Positive results are
evident in all existing CHA states, fueling a continued evolution in
the state administrative process, as more and more states imple-
ment a CHA.23 Many of the issues that led other states to transi-
20. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 76 (The basic purpose of a CHA is to give
Hearing Officers "a certain amount of independence from the agencies over
whose proceedings they preside."); Gerald E. Ruth, Unification of the Admin-
istrative Adjudicatory Process: An Emerging Framework to Increase "Judici-
alization" in Pennsylvania, 16 J. NAT'L AS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGE 221, 245
(1996).
21. Felter, supra note 6, at 9.
22. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 77. In addition to achieving these higher ob-
jectives, expectations in CHA states are to: 1) consolidate a "large number of
disparate hearing units into a professional, well managed agency"; 2) create a
uniform hearing process with consistent rules - something that will "demys-
tify" the agency hearing process; 3) streamline the process so that issues are
heard in a timely manner; 4) reduce the number of hearings; and 5) foster
settlement negotiations between parties prior to a hearing. Id.
23. See Ruth, supra note 20, at 244 ("Many of the sister states ... have
had tremendous success in developing central panel systems. These states
have proven that the overall effect on individual state agencies has been one
of efficiency, effectiveness, and improved quality."); Felter, supra note 6, at 7
2004]
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tion to another model are now being faced by Rhode Island. Exam-
ining the transition experiences of other states, and the variations
of a centralized approach, is integral in recommending possible
changes for Rhode Island.
A. The Transition Experience
Prior to the implementation of a CHA, these states faced simi-
lar problems and concerns arising from the use of in-house hear-
ing officers. Consequently, after the creation of a centralized
process, all transition states experienced similar benefits. Mary-
land and Minnesota are typical examples of states that have im-
plemented a centralized administrative hearing process resulting
in a more efficient and superior agency hearing process.
1. Maryland - "The Model' 4
In 1990, Maryland implemented the Office of Administrative
Hearings (Maryland OAH), which is the largest hearing agency in
the country.25 Other states considering adopting a CHA view
Maryland as the model for administrative adjudication and often
visit its headquarters for guidance. 26 Because Maryland learned
from the experiences of other states, it "was able to capitalize on
an opportune situation."27 The implementation of Maryland's OAH
was "relatively easy" politically, as it received a strong recommen-
dation from a task force and was tenaciously supported by the
Governor. 28 The Maryland task force reported to the Governor and
legislature, "Since hearing examiners are employed by, and under
control of, the agency where contested case or disputed action
arises, there is an appearance of inherent unfairness; citizens be-
("Improved efficiency, and cost effectiveness of central panels, has been
documented in all of the states that have such a panel.").
24. MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, http://www.oah.state.md.us/Main%20Sections20of
20Home%2OPage/About%20OAH/About%20OAH%2OIndex.htm (last visited
May 3, 2004); Hoberg, supra note 2, at 84.
25. MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 24 Hoberg, supra note 2,
at 83.
26. MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 24 Hoberg, supra note 2,
at 84 ("Maryland continues to be the vanguard of central panel jurisdic-
tions.").
27. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 84.
28. Id. at 82-83.
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lieve they do not receive impartial adjudication."29 As a result, the
legislature established a strong central panel.30
Since implementation, the Maryland OAH has been viewed as
a success:
Four years of experience with the central hearing
agency in Maryland proves that the new system provides
both perceived and real impartiality. The Bar Associa-
tion, individual practitioners, agencies, union representa-
tives appearing on behalf of state employees, legislators,
the courts, and, above all, citizens, express satisfaction
with this new system of administrative justice.31
Real and perceived fairness were not the only achievements.
Maryland's OAH improved and streamlined the hearing process,
and at the same time reduced costs. 32 It resulted in cost-effective
government such as improved agency function, better use of the
constitutional courts, legislative streamlining, and superior hear-
ing officers. 33
2. Minnesota
In 1975, "against a backdrop of concerns about agency impar-
tiality, consistency, and accountability" the Minnesota legislature
established an independent central panel.3 4 Before the implemen-
tation of an independent hearing officer, the hearings "resulted in
'kangaroo courts' or at least created the appearance of unfair-
29. Hon. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and
Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT'L AS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGE 5, 22 (1994).
30. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 83.
31. Hardwicke, supra note 29, at 80.
32. MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 24. In addition, Mary-
land, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, to name a few, "be-
came more efficient and realized economic benefits as a consequence" of
creating a Central Hearing Agency. Ruth, supra note 20, at 253.
33. Hardwicke, supra note 29, at 81-82. To measure the results, the
Maryland OAH publishes a detailed annual report which includes the aver-
age case duration, the number of hearings, and a survey of participant satis-
faction. MD. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 24. A comparison of this
annual report to past results illustrates the success of Maryland's OAH and
why it serves as a model to other states. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 84.
34. Hon. Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within an
Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV
445,448 (2001).
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ness."35 In some extreme cases, the agency attorneys would advise
the hearing officer on the final decision or even sit in on the pro-
ceeding and provide guidance on each ruling. 36 Ultimately, be-
cause the legislature concluded that to ensure a fair hearing an
independent third-party decision-maker was needed, it created the
Office of Administrative Hearings (Minnesota OAH).37
Minnesota's OAH has dramatically reduced costs and acceler-
ated the administrative process.38 Minnesota Chief Judge Duane
R. Harves found "a reduction of hearing costs for the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission from $400,000 in fiscal year 1976 to
$311,330 in fiscal year 1977, and to $184,219 for fiscal year
1982." 39 Prior to the creation of Minnesota's OAH, agency hearings
were sometimes delayed for six to twelve months.40 Since
implementation, an agency is able to obtain a hearing date within
twenty-four hours of requesting a hearing officer. 41 The hearing is
usually set thirty to forty-five days after requesting hearing exam-
iner appointment. 42 Harves concludes:
[T]he central panel system has resulted in a more effi-
cient, effective administrative hearing process. Costs
have dropped dramatically and cases can now be both
heard and decided more promptly. And, it appears that in
most cases all parties are satisfied with the process and
the fairness of that process even if not necessarily satis-
fied with the decision. 43
The triumph in Minnesota is indicative of the success other states
have experienced as a result of a change to a centralized hearing
process. 44 The consensus in states now using a CHA is that this
35. Duane R. Harves, Making the Administrative Proceedings More Effi-
cient and Effective: How the AL] Central Panel Works in Minnesota, 65
JUDICATURE 257, 258 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing 1975 Minn. Laws 380).
38. Id. at 257, 263-64.
39. Ruth, supra note 20, at 254 (citing Duane R. Harves, The Minnesota
Experience, MD. BAR. J., Dec. 1986, at 11).
40. Harves, supra note 35, at 264.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 265.
44. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 78 ("The general consensus is that central
panel systems have worked well in the states. Not one state that has adopted
the central panel system has repealed the implementing legislation.").
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system results in a fairer and more efficient administrative proc-
ess - one that breeds satisfaction. Although the general CHA
model has been universally successful, wide variation in the CHA
process exists.
B. Central Hearing Agency Differences: A Closer Look
Differences in the centralized process arose from many fac-
tors, including the size of the state, the structure of the state gov-
ernment, and preference. The three principal areas in which
CHAs vary are: 1) the jurisdiction of the CHA; 2) the decision-
making autonomy of the independent hearing officer; and 3) the
funding process for the CHA.4 5
1. Jurisdiction
There are three approaches to CHA jurisdiction. Some states
take an "expanded jurisdiction" approach and require almost all
state agencies to use the CHA during the hearing process.46 Under
the "middle" approach,47 states usually exempt the larger agencies
within the state from using the CHA and, thus, the CHA has a re-
duced caseload. 48 However, the CHA is authorized to hear a case
involving an exempted agency upon request of that agency.49 In
these "middle" states, the CHA possesses enough jurisdiction to
remain an integral part of the state's administrative system.50 Fi-
45. The Federal system and some states have agency specific hearing of-
ficers. This means that each agency has a separate division within the agency
that is dedicated entirely to the function of a hearing officer. In Rhode Island
for example, the Department of Environmental Management has been
purposefully organized this way by statute. While this is better than the
"agency staff' approach, many of the same issues still apply. Moreover, it
would not seem feasible or efficient for Rhode Island to have a hearing officer
within every agency. See Ruth, supra note 20, at 237.
46. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 78-80; see Rich, supra note 11, at 251. Three
states that clearly fall into this category are Maryland, Minnesota and New
Jersey. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 83 n.60.
47. Id. at 87 n.93 (noting that Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina,
Virginia, and North Dakota fall into this "middle" category).
48. Id. at 87.
49. Id.; Rich, supra note 11, at 251.
50. Regardless of whether a state falls into an "expanded" or "middle"
category, states such as Colorado, Florida, Minnesota and New Jersey re-
quire all agencies to use the Central Hearing Agency, except those specifi-
cally excluded by state statute. Which category the state falls into depends on
how many agencies are excluded. Rich, supra note 11, at 251.
20041 743
744 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:735
nally, "low maintenance" states require very few agencies to use
the CHA. Therefore, the CHA functions mostly in a voluntary ca-
pacity with very little, if any, jurisdiction.51
Proponents of a mandatory jurisdiction system, or "expanded
jurisdiction," claim that allowing an agency to decide which cases
should be brought before the independent hearing officer corrupts
the system. 52 Their concern is that sensitive cases - ones that may
either largely impact agency policy or that may lead to large
monetary fines - will be heard by the substantive agency and
"thus destroy the appearance of justice the central panel is de-
signed to support."53 Advocates of the voluntary system used in
"low maintenance" states assert that such a process is less threat-
ening and implementation of a central panel will be smoother.54
Thus agencies which voluntarily use the CHA will become more
comfortable with the procedure and experience its advantages. 55
The end result of a voluntary system, however, is that agencies
prefer to use their own employees as hearing officers. 56
2. Autonomy
In addition to varying jurisdiction, there are differences in the
amount of autonomy given to the hearing officer in rendering final
decisions. An effective hearing officer must have a "significant
substantive voice" independent of an agency.57 In some CHA
states, the decision of the CHA's hearing officer is the final deci-
sion and not subject to agency review.58 This structure represents
51. Id.; Hoberg, supra note 2, at 87-88 (stating that Texas and Massa-
chusetts are low maintenance states).
52. Rich, supra note 11, at 251.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Abrams, supra note 4, at 495.
57. Id. at 498.
58. McNeil, supra note 7, at 497 (quoting MODEL ACT CREATING A STATE
CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY § 1-10(a) (1997)). Twelve states issue final deci-
sions only in certain cases and "Missouri is the only state where decisions of
the AIJs are final agency action in every case." Edwin L. Felter, Jr., The
Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary: Colorado's Central Panel Experience -
Lessons for the Feds, 14 J. NAT'L AS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGE 95, 97 n.17 (1994); see
also William B. Swent, South Carolina's ALJ: Central Panel, Administrative
Court, or a Little of Both, 48 S.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) ("At the extreme high
level of independence, the 'administrative court' system generally grants ex-
clusive jurisdiction over statutorily defined, contested cases.").
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a vast amount of CHA independence. 59 Conversely, many more
states allow the director of the substantive agency to have final
approval of any decision - similar to the process before the crea-
tion of a CHA. The decision of the independent hearing officer is
subject to approval, rejection or modification by the agency's direc-
tor.60 Even though control over the final decision is placed in
agency hands, this grant of authority is not as drastic as it seems,
because the agency "is not free to manipulate the report to suit it-
self."61 The director is less likely to reject or modify a CHA deci-
sion because 1) there is a "structurally independent" hearing
officer, 62 and 2) the director may only do so "for specified reasons
in accordance with law."63
If an agency director arbitrarily overturns an independent de-
cision, he or she will be viewed negatively by the judiciary who
may hear an appeal, the legal community, and the general public.
Therefore, the director "will ordinarily have to disagree strongly"
with a CHA decision before rejecting it.64 In California, a state
with a CHA system that leaves final approval in the hands of an
agency director, decisions of hearing officers are very rarely re-
jected.65 The relatively minimal interference by the director may
be attributed to the "structural independence" of the hearing offi-
cers, which "insures that the agency may be exposed to a different
viewpoint, one which cannot be ignored and can be rejected only
for sound reasons."66 Thus, even when the director has approval,
CHA hearing officers retain significant autonomy.
59. There is still a question of the amount of agency influence on a mat-
ter. For example, in Minnesota the agency must create a policy in the form of
a rule. In the words of one director: "Once established, and the rule is in ef-
fect, the office of administrative hearings is bound to follow that rule. Only
the courts may find the rule illegal; a rule may not be challenged in a hear-
ing." Rich, supra note 11, at 256. Some states are bound to regulations but
not agency interpretations. Florida finds "agency interpretations as persua-
sive but not binding." Id. "As a practical matter, hearing officers are probably
not greatly influenced by agency interpretations simply because it's the
agency interpretation." Id.
60. Swent, supra note 58, at 2.
61. McNeil, supra note 7, at 497.
62. Abrams, supra note 4, at 506.
63. McNeil, supra note 7, at 497-98 (citing the Model Act).
64. Id.
65. Abrams, supra note 4, at 499 (Only about five-percent of Hearing Of-
ficers' decisions were overturned by agencies.).
66. Id.
2004]
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3. Funding
Another difference between CHA states is the means by which
the CHA is funded. There are two major methods of funding: 1)
through the general fund of a state; or 2) through a "revolving
fund" that charges agencies for the use of hearing officers' time.67
Both methods shift some financial control from the individual
agency to the CHA.68
In the "general fund" approach, as with any other state
agency, the legislature appropriates a lump sum for the CHA,
which is charged with preparing its own budget.69 The CHA pro-
vides hearing officers to the individual agencies as needed.7 0 The
"revolving fund" approach creates a more "businesslike" atmos-
phere.71 Instead of a lump sum allocation, the CHA bills the
agency for the services rendered by the hearing officers, usually on
an hourly basis. 72 The CHA is therefore funded through the budg-
ets of other state agencies using the CHA's services.
There is a split in opinion as to which method is more effec-
tive. 73 The argument for the "revolving fund" method is that it
puts the "budgetary decision for these costs where it ought to be -
at the individual agency level." 74 Advocates suggest that this
method will lead to fewer hearings by encouraging the state agen-
cies to settle issues to avoid tapping into the agency's budget. 75
Opponents argue that this incentive to settle, while economical, is
a drawback, as fewer hearings may "threaten the notion of due
process that central panels are supposed to protect."76 The
agency's motivation to pursue a hearing is based on budgeting
concerns rather than considerations of fairness. Conversely, under
the "general fund" method, the substantive agency has little in-
centive to reduce the amount of hearings through settlement, be-
cause budgeting is not an issue. Moreover, when the CHA is given
67. Abrams, supra note 4, at 506; Rich, supra note 11, at 250.
68. Rich, supra note 11, at 250.
69. Id.
70. Abrams, supra note 4, at 506.
71. Id. at 507.
72. Rich, supra note 11, at 250.
73. Id.
74. Abrams, supra note 4, at 508.
75. Rich, supra note 11, at 250.
76. Id.
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a lump sum budget, the substantive agency also has less motiva-
tion to expedite a matter through the hearing process.
A positive aspect of the general fund approach is that the re-
lationship between the agency and the CHA, while less "business-
like," is less strained. The CHA's budget is not dependent on the
number of hearings requested by state agencies. Even though the
CHA and the agency have different roles in the hearing process,
the two are on a more equal footing within state government, and
would receive budgeting in a like manner. Moreover, without the
pressure to resolve one case quickly in order to move on to the
next, the hearing officer may focus on quality rather than on
quantity. Based on its own priorities, each state must decide on its
own which method of funding is most appropriate.
These variations in jurisdiction, autonomy, and funding result
from differences in state size, organization, and constituency.
However, the major premise is the same: a required separation be-
tween the decision-maker and the agency. Despite success in CHA
states, opposition to such change remains.
C. Arguments Against Implementing a Central Hearing Agency
The primary arguments against a CHA most often originate
from the agencies losing the ability to decide cases.77 The opposi-
tion's major arguments fall into two categories: 1) the issue of ex-
pertise; and 2) the role of the agency in policymaking. 7s
Additionally, opponents invoke fears of increased bureaucracy, the
creation of a "Super Agency" responsible to no one, and agency is-
sues falling into the hands of novices. 79 These concerns appear to
77. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 229 ("State agencies frequently oppose
the use of central hearing panels."); see also Hardwicke, supra note 8, at 423
("The roadblock to the creation of the central panel encountered in almost
every state arises from objections raised by executive branch agencies.");
Swent, supra note 58, at 9 ("Those states having recently adopted a central
panel approach ... report significant hostility from the affected agencies. The
complainants most often stem from a sense of lost authority."). Notwithstand-
ing these arguments, states continue to migrate to a CHA system - perhaps
the opposition has slowed this migration over the past fifty-eight years. The
first was California in 1945. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 77. The last appears to
be Oregon in 1999. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 219.
78. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 229-32.
79. Hardwicke, supra note 29, at 49; Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 229-
32; Swent, supra note 58, at 9-10.
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be exaggerated and are outweighed by the importance of having a
neutral decision-maker and, subsequently, a fair process.
Undeniably, agency employees acting as hearing officers have
the most substantive expertise on the subject matter at issue.80
This expertise argument is summed up in a 1989 report by the
Commission on Administrative Hearings before the Oregon Legis-
lature:
[A]gencies are highly dependent on the specialized
knowledge of the hearing officers regarding such matters
as specific administrative rules and regulations, medical
terminology, regulatory schemes, and substantive legal
knowledge, such as knowledge of labor law. These agency
representatives believe agency hearing would be far less
efficient without the benefit of the expertise of the hear-
ing officers employed by the agency.8'
Despite these assertions, the argument that not having an
"agency expert" as a hearing officer would create inefficiency is
unsubstantiated. First, in states that have created a CHA, effi-
ciency has improved as the duration of the hearing process has de-
creased.8 2 Second, CHA states have reduced the cost of the
80. See Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 230-31 (citing REPORT OF THE
COMMISION ON ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS TO THE SIxTY-FIFTH LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE OREGON SUPREME COURT AND THE
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF OREGON 7-8 (APR. 21, 1989)).
81. Id. at 231.
82. See Felter, supra note 6, at 7; Harves, supra note 35, at 264; Ruth,
supra note 20, at 244. Additionally, independent hearing officers in CHA
states receive specialized training and naturally become more familiar with
certain issues as time passes. To facilitate this learning curve and provide a
center of knowledge, Maryland's OAH contains a fully staffed library. MD.
OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, LIBRARY SERVICES, http://www.oah.state.
md.us/Library/library-services.htm (last visited May 3, 2004). Use of new
technology, such as the Internet, could also help minimize the effect of having
a non-agency employee hear and decide issues. Another idea is to create a da-
tabase, or use one in existence such as Lexis or Westlaw, that would allow
hearing officers, attorneys, and the public to access decisions. A centralized
database would provide the most access and would help educate the inde-
pendent hearing officer on scientific and technical issues and provide guid-
ance to the general public. Some Rhode Island Agencies individually post
decisions on their websites facilitating public access. R.I. DEP'T OF LABOR.
RHODE IsLAND BOARD OF REVIEW, http://www.dlt.ri.govfbor/searchcases.htm
(last visited May 3, 2004). Others, pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act, allow the public to physically enter the agency to research past decisions.
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administrative process.83 Even if implementing a CHA were less
efficient - which has proven not to be the case - impartiality and
fairness should be "stronger considerations than that of exper-
tise."84
The expertise argument is a double-edged sword. The exper-
tise of an agency employee is usually "intermeshed with agency
policy or agency political directive." 5 The employee is intimately
familiar with the agency's affairs because it is his or her job to ad-
vocate agency policy. While this "expertise" may theoretically di-
minish hearing time8 6 and assure the agency's policy objectives
are represented, it creates a problem: the hearing officer, as an
agency employee, has preconceived ideas that may prejudice a de-
cision and undermine the process.8 7 A fairer solution is to allow
the agency to introduce technical expertise as evidence in the
course of a CHA hearing; evidence that will be weighed properly
by an independent hearing officer.
Secondly, proponents of a non-CHA system argue that agency
policy will be ignored if that agency is unable to appoint one of its
own as a hearing officer.88 However, the adversarial hearing proc-
ess is well-equipped to document and consider agency policy, and
give it the appropriate deference it deserves.8 9 The substantive
Sometimes prior decisions are given to the parties by a hearing officer, which
might be relevant to the case at hand.
83. Ruth, supra note 20, at 253; Harves, supra note 35, at 263.
84. Davis, supra note 6, at 401 (citing COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE,
ADMIN. PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-
50 (1941)); HOOVER COMM'N REPORT 88-93; HOOVER COMM'N TASK FORCE
REPORT 257-69).
85. Hardwicke, supra note 29, at 62.
86. Contrary to this argument, hearing times have been diminished in
states that have enacted a CHA. See Harves, supra note 35, at 264.
87. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 232.
88. Opponents of CHAs argue that a transfer of authority to the central
panel may lead to a lower level of accountability and cause an undermining of
agency policy. "[W]itnesses, many of them agency heads, expressed concern
that hearing officers, free of agency control, would render decisions undercut-
ting their prerogatives to set agency priorities and decide agency policies." Id.
at 229 (quoting Report of the Commission on Administrative Hearings to the
Sixty-Fifth Legislative Assembly, the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court and the Governor of the State of Oregon 7-8 (Apr. 21, 1989)).
89. Swent, supra note 58, at 10.
True agency expertise, that is to say matters of science and tech-
nology, can be put in the record through appropriate expert testi-
mony in the course of the hearing, and where such expert
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agency appoints a well-qualified representative to advocate its po-
sition, usually an agency attorney. Therefore, agency policy should
be introduced through the hearing process itself, not through the
preconceived notions of the hearing officer. 90 Moreover, the argu-
ment that a CHA undercuts agency policy is not as strong in the
majority of states that allow the agency's director to review the
decision and "modify, reverse or remand the proposed decision of
the administrative law judge.., in accordance with law."91 The
decision by a neutral and independent hearing officer would be
difficult to overturn on the facts. The director, however, would still
be able to reverse on policy interpretation grounds, ensuring that
agency policy is not overlooked. This agency review creates a sys-
tem of checks and balances.
Contrary to the argument that a CHA undercuts agency pol-
icy, the decision of an independent hearing officer instead legiti-
mizes it; "In a real sense the central panel is a collaborator with
the substantive agency for which it holds hearings."92 The agency's
representative, who is also integrally familiar with any agency is-
sue at controversy, has every opportunity to present evidence and
convince a neutral hearing officer of the agency's position. Both
the substantive agency and the hearing agency are "governmental
ministries created to promote public purposes, and in this sense
they are collaborative instrumentalities, rather than rivals or
competitors, in the paramount task of safeguarding the interests
of our citizens."93 As a former Maryland Chief Administrative Law
Judge observes, "the creation of a [CHA] recognizes the benefits of
unbundling the adjudicative function of the agency without offend-
ing the executive mission of the substantive agency."94 In sum, the
decision of a neutral hearing officer would legitimize, rather than
ignore or undercut, agency policy.
A shift in power, such as one created by the implementation of
a CHA, creates controversy among the state agencies who feel
conclusions are debatable, contrary scientific evidence may be con-
sidered and decided as a factual matter by an AIJ.
Hardwicke, supra note 29, at 60 (citations omitted).
90. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 232.
91. Id. at 230; McNeil, supra note 7, at 497-98 (quoting MODEL ACT TO
CREATE A STATE CENT. HEARING AGENCY § 1-11 (1997)).
92. Hardwicke, supra note 8, at 434.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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they are surrendering authority. This has occurred in many states
and has been overcome by the basic proposition that "there can
hardly be a more important component of fair procedure than the
requirement that the [decision-maker] be neutral or unbiased to-
wards the parties and the issues before him or her."95
III. THE TRADITIONAL HEARING PROCESS APPROACH
'I'll let you write the substance ... and you let me write
the procedure, and I'll screw you every time."9 6
Representative John Dingell
It is axiomatic that whoever controls the procedure has a
clear advantage over the process. Many states, including Rhode
Island, provide for agency control over administrative adjudication
procedure. This control leads to an abusive system.97 The "judicial-
like" hearing process employed in these states demands an inde-
pendent decision-maker to "maintain both the appearance and re-
ality of unbiased decision-making." 98 Approximately half of the
states empower individual agencies to appoint their own employ-
ees as hearing officers. This control gives rise to several serious
issues: 1) fairness and equity; 2) the appearance of fairness; 3) the
timeliness of the process; 4) lack of conformity; 5) overlapping ju-
risdiction between agencies; and 6) a potential for a backlog in the
judiciary.
A. Fairness and Equity
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that separa-
tion of the decision-making and investigative functions can be a
95. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 426 (2D
ED. 1992) (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267 (1975)).
96. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John
Dingell).
97. See Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 224 ("[Plroponents argue that al-
lowing the agency to control the fact-finding portion... gives the agency an
unbeatable hand and leads to abuses of the agency's power over regulated in-
dividuals and businesses.").
98. Abrams, supra note 4, at 522.
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necessary component of due process. 99 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the
Court stated:
We agree with the District Court that prior involve-
ment in some aspects of the case will not necessarily bar
a welfare official from acting as a decision maker. He
should not, however, have participated in making the de-
termination under review. 100
To comply with Goldberg, agencies have erected interoffice barri-
ers. Even this semblance of separation, however, does not allay
several problems including conflicts of interest and resulting bias.
As a general rule:
[TIhere can hardly be a more important component of fair
procedure than the requirement that the [decision-maker]
be neutral or unbiased towards the parties and the issues
before him or her. The proposition that no person should
be the judge in his or her own case has been an integral
part of natural justice.., since the Seventeenth Century
and it is the basic underpinning of the concept of separa-
tion of powers. 1 1
A hearing officer is prohibited from having a personal finan-
cial interest in the outcome of a decision.10 2 The existence of a fi-
nancial interest, even an indirect one, "violates the concept of due
process because it denies... the right to a fair hearing."1°3 As dis-
cussed in the sections immediatley below, a hearing officer may
have several interests that conflict with her role as an adjudicator.
In many instances, the appointed hearing officer is a staff at-
torney who, as an employee, represents the interests of the
agency. This staff attorney has an attorney-client relationship
with the agency. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state,
"[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibili-
ties to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
99. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
100. Id.
101. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 95, at 426.
102. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 95, at 426 (citing Ward v. Village of Mon-
roeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); see also Tumey v. Ohio 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
103. Id.
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interests . "... 104 In acting as a decision-maker, this attorney may
have to make a decision contrary to the best interests of his or her
client, the agency. By not acting in the agency's best interests, the
attorney/hearing officer theoretically violates this model rule be-
cause his representation of the agency has been materially lim-
ited, or even overcome, by his actions as hearing officer. A CHA
model segregating the agency from the hearing officer would pre-
vent such a conflict between the agency and its employee.10 5
Furthermore, the hearing officer has personal interests which
create an additional conflict and may interfere with his or her
roles as attorney and the decision-maker.
1. Friend or Foe?
The hearing officer is often a colleague of the agency's prose-
cutor. This co-worker relationship creates an unfair process. The
prosecutor is likely to have an intimate understanding of the hear-
ing officer's thought process, placing an outside party at a disad-
vantage. Additionally, the individuals serving as prosecutor and
hearing officer sometimes wear multiple hats; the prosecutor may
serve as a hearing officer for the agency, while the current hearing
officer becomes the prosecutor in another matter. One hearing of-
ficer judging another creates conflict and bias. Inherent in this re-
lationship between colleagues are "[dlangerous influences [that]
may be subtle and difficult to ferret out ... [and] the decision-
making process is harmed when there is even a risk that its integ-
rity has been compromised." 10 6 There is a dangerous undercurrent
when a decision in one case might impact the decision of another
case. A CHA eliminates prejudice and inequity by providing hear-
ing officers free from bias created by co-worker relationships. 0 7
2. Bias Toward Agency Policy
Two situations may cause bias in agency hearings. First, the
primary job of any agency employee, including hearing officers, is
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001).
105. See Hardwicke, supra note 8, at 422 ("The genesis of the [CHAI
movement arose from concerns that an employee of a substantive agency
could not be trusted to render a fair and impartial decision involving contro-
versy between the agency and citizen.").
106. Abrams, supra note 4, at 522.
107. See Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 224.
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to facilitate agency policy. Advocating agency policy conflicts with
a hearing officer's duty of impartiality. Secondly, the decision of
the hearing officer is presented to the director of the agency, the
hearing officer's superior.0 The potential for undue influence ex-
ists when a factual determination must be presented to an
agency's director for approval. The employee is in a position where
the decision presented to the director may adversely affect career
advancement. The same biases exhibited by the hearing officer
may appear in the director's review of the decision. 109
Even though a hearing officer might be acting with the ut-
most impartiality under the circumstances, these underlying con-
flicts are ingrained in his or her thought process. 110 In every
decision, whether it involves deciding a motion, issuing a sub-
poena, or making a final determination, these biases run deep. To
expect anyone to be neutral in this situation is naive. A CHA sys-
tem would prevent bias towards the agency: "Proponents of the
[CHA] approach... claim that detachment of judges from their
respective agencies makes them less likely to blindly honor agency
policy."111 A CHA hearing officer, by contrast, is not subject to the
authority of the director of the agency involved in the underlying
matter. 12 A CHA hearing officer's career advancements are de-
pendent on providing a fair and expedient process, not appeasing
the involved agency's director. 1 3
108. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINEss REGULATION
§ 18(F), http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/pdf forms/Regs/Admin%20Hearings%2ORe
file.pdf (Dec. 27, 2001).
109. The director, as the agency head, is likely to be more determined to
further agency policy than the hearing officer.
110. In my limited experience as an intern at the Department of Business
Regulation, all of the employees acting as hearing officers attempted as best
they could to act impartially and in good faith toward all parties.
111. Swent, supra note 58, at 7.
112. Abrams, supra note 4, at 491.
113. Felter, supra note 6, at 9.
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3. Budget Concerns
"Some day, when things are tough, maybe you can ask the
boys [and girls] to go in there and win just one for the
Gipper."11
The cyclical nature of the economy will sometimes elevate the
fiscal stress on the traditional hearing process. In a depressed
economy, state government agencies are more susceptible to budg-
etary cuts. During these times, hearing officers, who make deci-
sions on the amount of fines and sanctions, are put under
pressure. Their decisions may affect the agency's budget. 115 There-
fore, a decision may be tainted by this underlying economic pres-
sure.
For example, the Rhode Island administrative process is un-
der strain because of the current economy. Governor Carcieri's
Fiscal Fitness program is an attempt to deal with this issue. The
Fiscal Fitness program is intended to "mak[e] Rhode Island a
model for the delivery of cost efficient service to taxpayers." 116
Governor Carcieri describes the program as a "far reaching initia-
tive [that] will focus on how to cut costs, improve efficiencies and
reduce waste - both in time and materials."117 To ferret out gov-
ernment inefficiency and cut potential costs, "[n]o one agency or
department will be singled out," and "[n]othing is off limits."118 As
114. KNUTE ROCKNE: ALL AMERICAN (1940). In this movie, Ronald Reagan
was portraying George Gipp, a legendary football hero also known as the
"Gipper." Here the reference to the "Gipper" refers to Rhode Island Governor
Carcieri. Use of this quote implies that executive branch agencies, and their
hearing officers, will be faced with financial pressure, and as a result, may
rule in favor of their agency. In essence, the hearing officer would be "win-
ning one for the Gipper," by ruling for the agency. As a consequence, the deci-
sion would be tainted.
115. The productivity of an agency is sometimes measured by the amount
of fines collected. An agency that is extremely active and generates revenue
through these fines is unlikely to be reduced or cut. The amount collected is
often credited to the agency, and sometimes to inter-agency departments. The
inherent competitiveness and desire to be productive may ultimately result in
an unfair process.
116. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Carcieri Launches Governor's
Fiscal Fitness Program (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.ri.gov/info/press/pr.
php?ID=ll (last visited May 3, 2004) [hereinafter Carcieri Press Release].
117. Id.
118. Id.
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agency employees, the hearing officers are subject to the Gover-
nor's program. 119 Faced with cost cuts, a hearing officer may in-
crease fines and sanctions to augment the agency's budget.
Ironically, as discussed below, the current administrative hearing
process itself leads to inefficiency. 120 Implementing a CHA system
would minimize adverse economic effects on the administrative
process, and at the same time provide the Governor an opportu-
nity to create a more efficient system.
B. The Appearance of Fairness and Equity in the Eyes of the
Legal Community and the General Public.
Even if using agency employees as hearing officers results in
a fair process, agency employees rendering decisions creates a
"loss of public trust."121 The current procedure creates an appear-
119. The Governor's goal of creating efficiency and reducing costs for the
Rhode Island taxpayer is noble. Additionally, there is currently a movement
in Rhode Island to change the structure of the state government. This move-
ment has resulted in the formation of the Separation-of-Powers Bill ("SOP
Bill") which was approved by the General Assembly and is pending a voter
referendum in November 2004. The SOP Bill would prevent "lawmakers...
from serving on or appointing colleagues to state boards and commissions."
Governor, Lawmakers Praise Separation-Of-Powers Bill: Measure Would
Change 340 Years Of R.I. Government, NEWS CHANNEL TEN, http://www.
turntolO.com/politics/2308637/detail.html (July 2, 2003). Additionally, "[tihe
bill approved by the General Assembly... would also strengthen the gover-
nor's appointment powers." Id. In assessing the SOP Bill, Roger Williams
School of Law Professor Carl Bogus states: "This [Bill] will have profound
implications, though no one can predict what they all will be. This is about
avoiding a concentration of power in one governmental department, and
about checks and balances among the branches." Rhode Island May Change
Power Structure, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http'//www.jsonline.com/election2000/
ap/ju103/ap-rhode-island-go072 103.asp (July 21, 2003) (copy on file with au-
thor). The passage of the Bill was fueled by the view that Rhode Island's
"current system has encouraged political patronage." Id. While the exact im-
plications are unclear, "many say it can only help the image of a state known
for corruption and political dealmaking." Id. Even though its implications are
uncertain, the passage of the SOP will benefit Rhode Island as a whole. It is
unlikely, however, to have any significant impact on the agency hearing proc-
ess discussed here. The same paradigm of creating a "form of government our
founding fathers envisioned," should be applied to changing agency adjudica-
tion and creating a fair and equitable process. Press Release, Office of the
Governor, Carcieri Celebrates Transmittal of Separation of Powers Resolu-
tion, http://www.gov.state.ri.us/pr.php?ID=87 (Apr. 22, 2003).
120. See infra Part III.C.
121. Heynderickx, supra note 8, at 225.
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ance of impropriety in the eyes of the legal community, judiciary
and general population. Because of the judicial nature of the proc-
ess, a person or entity summoned before an agency for a hearing
expects to receive a fair and impartial determination. 122 Once the
respondent learns that the hearing officer is an agency employee,
any prior expectation of fairness quickly evaporates. 123 This mis-
trust of the hearing officer might increase the likelihood of an ap-
peal to the superior court. Additionally, the judiciary is aware that
the hearing officer is an employee of the agency and may not give
proper deference to the agency's decision. 124 Even if the hearing
officer is able to maintain an impartial state of mind, there is still
the appearance of inequity that causes public mistrust. Appear-
ance of impropriety is reason enough to implement a new system.
C. The "Timeliness" Issue
The "judicial" nature of the administrative process and the
ensuing appeal may cause an undue delay in the resolution of a
case. For example, one such delay led a Rhode Island Superior
Court Judge to question the fairness of such a drawn-out process:
Although the issue of timeliness was never raised, it is
discomforting that the disciplinary hearing, threatening a
license, took so long to wind its way through the Depart-
ment... In reviewing whether court imposed deadlines
were an appropriate remedy for delays in departmental
application our Supreme Court stated: "Moreover, the
trial justice's finding is in accord with the general rule of
administrative procedure under which, absent a specific
122. Id. at 226.
123. Id. As an intern at the Department of Business Regulation (DBR),
the author witnessed several respondents at agency preconference hearings
and hearings question the role of the hearing officer as an employee of the
agency. In response, the hearing officers cited Kent County Water Authority
v. Rhode Island, 723 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1999) as a case upholding this procedure.
See infra Part IV.C.
124. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring federal courts to give deference to federal
agencies).
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time frame, public hearings must be held within a rea-
sonable time."125
The judge invoked a decision where the Department of Environ-
mental Management ("DEM") was overturned purely because of
the length of the administrative process. 126 He concluded, "Such
an extensive delay when one's license is at risk may be unfair."127
Simply put, the current hearing process is inefficient and often
takes too long. Having an agency solely dedicated to administra-
tive hearings, such as a CHA, will streamline and shorten the
process.128
D. Lack of Standardization
The amount of time it takes to resolve an agency issue is fur-
ther adversely affected by a lack of standardization among agen-
cies. Because the procedures vary from agency to agency,
attorneys may be unfamiliar with a particular agency's proce-
dures. Justice Scalia observed in a letter to Congressman John
Dingell:
While absolute standardization, of course, is not desir-
able, the basic principle of a uniform administrative prac-
tice, with only such variations as operational differences
justify, serves several important values. It is indispensa-
ble to the retention of an administrative system that can
be fathomed by the general public and penetrated by law-
yers who are not specialists .... 129
While most agencies use director-appointed hearing officers
and allow the director final approval of the decision, they differ in
their procedures. These procedural differences may include notice,
evidence, motions, and the hearing process itself. Familiarity with
these procedural differences may impact the final outcome of an
125. Annarumo v. Department of Business Regulation, 2003 WL
22389585, at *4 n.7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sep. 30, 2003) (citing Vito v. DEM 589
A.2d 809, 813-14 (R.I. 1991)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Harves, supra note 35, at 265.
129. McNeil, supra note 7, at 481-82 (citing Marshall J. Breger, The APA:
An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REv. 337, 344-45 (1986)
(quoting Letter from Antonin Scalia, Chair, Admin. Conf. of the U.S., to Con-
gressman John Dingell (May 23, 1974))).
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agency hearing. The staff attorney has a clear advantage by being
intimately familiar with that agency's procedure. As an Adminis-
trative Hearing Examiner in Ohio observed:
An honest evaluation of the status quo without the cen-
tral panel may likely produce the recognition that proce-
dures vary so dramatically from agency to agency as to
leave the bar and the general public wholly without use-
ful guidance as to the manner by which agency matters
are litigated. Scattered and obscure rules and inconsis-
tent procedures in force within state agencies ... create a
substantial drag on the process of resolving regulatory
disputes.130
The hearing officer, while well-schooled in the agency issues
at hand, might not be well-versed in the art of courtroom proce-
dure and decorum. Therefore, the lack of standardization between
hearing officers creates inefficiency. Even though the process has
been "judicialized," there is little or no precedent for hearing offi-
cers or parties to follow. While establishing identical procedures in
all agencies is impossible, some standardization is desirable and
would allow attorneys and the public to become familiar with the
process. 131 Using a centralized system would standardize the proc-
ess.
132
E. Controversies Involving Multiple Agencies
Issues involved in a single controversy may not be exclusive to
one state agency. If an issue arises invoking the jurisdiction of
more than one agency, a respondent may be required to face more
than one hearing officer. A CHA would resolve all administrative
issues in a single proceeding. The CHA hearing officer would have
authority to summon multiple agencies to appear before her. All of
the issues related to the controversy could be resolved, at once
creating a more efficient process.
130. Id. at 480-81.
131. Id. at 481-82.
132. See Hoberg, supra note 2, at 77.
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F. Judicial Backlog
A consequence of the traditional approach and the resulting
appearance of impropriety is the potential for backlog in the
courts caused by agency appeals. Many of these appeals require
further time on the part of agency employees to write briefs and
appear in court. Judges, clerks and courtroom personnel now be-
come involved in the dispute, adding to the state government's
costs. Implementing an equitable and fair administrative hearing
system - one with an independent decision maker - would likely
reduce the amount of appeals to the superior court.
Issues of fairness, the appearance of fairness, efficiency, cost,
timeliness and credibility plague the traditional administrative
process. These issues lead to global government inefficiency, a
taxpayer burden and public mistrust. A closer look at Rhode Is-
land's traditional process reveals an opportunity for change.
IV. THE RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS: A
"JUDICIALIZED" PROCESS MINUS THE JUDGE
Rhode Island's administrative adjudication resembles a judi-
cial process with a major caveat; the hearing officer is not an in-
dependent third-party judge. A Rhode Island agency's director will
appoint a hearing officer who is his or her subordinate and is em-
ployed by that individual agency.133 The hearing officer conducts a
133. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 2 (F). Other state
agencies similarly require the appointment of a hearing officer by the indi-
vidual agency's Director. R.I. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES BEFORE THE RHODE
ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, RETARDATION, AND HOSPITALS § 4.1
(2002), http://www.rules.state.ri.us/dar/regdocs/released/pdf/MHRH/MHRH-
1747_.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004); R.I. DEP'T OF LABOR AND TRAINING,
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING RULE 15: REVOCATION
HEARING PROCEDURE UNDER 28-42-63.1 § 4(a) ("Hearings shall be conducted
by a hearing officer appointed by the Director who shall have authority to ex-
amine witnesses, to rule on motions, and to rule upon the admissibility of evi-
dence"), http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/DLT/DLT_345-.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2004); R.I. DEP'T OF ADMIN., RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, § 2.06 ("Hearing Officer" means the
person authorized by law or duly designated by the Director or Administrator
to hear, conduct and recommend decisions, or render final determinations in
contested cases."), http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/DOA/DOA-
478-.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004); R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REGARDING
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH § 1.2 (1980)
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judicial-like proceeding and makes important factual determina-
tions impacting Rhode Island citizens. These decisions involve li-
censing, taxes, health, environmental management, and
employment and labor, among other administrative subjects. In
short, the administrative hearing process has developed into a
mini-trial where an agency employee is functioning as a schedul-
ing clerk, judge and jury.134
A. A Closer Look at Rhode Island Agency's Hearing Process: The
Department of Business Regulation
This section examines the Department of Business Regula-
tion's (DBR) administrative procedure. The DBR employs a gar-
den-variety 135 agency hearing process to enforce regulations that
fall under several broad categories such as banking, securities,
("AHO means the Administrative Hearing Officer authorized by law or duly
designated by the Director and/or Board, to hear and decide, or to make a
recommended order and/or decision to the Director or Board."),
http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdffDOHIDOH-2454.pdf (last vis-
ited May, 12 2004); R.I. DIv. OF TAXATION, ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
PROCEDURES REGULATION AHP 97-01 § B(8)(a) ("Hearings shall be conducted
by a hearing officer appointed by the Tax Administrator who shall have au-
thority to examine witnesses, to rule on motions, and to rule upon the
admissibility of evidence."), http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/
DOTAX/DOTAX_752_.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004). The DEM's process is
specifically governed by Rhode Island Law pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
17.7. DEM is mandated by statute to have an independent inter-agency de-
partment that is allocated entirely to adjudicative hearings - a solution that
still has many of the same issues and is not effective in Rhode Island. A
Pennsylvania Administrative Law Judge gives five reasons why "[tihis solu-
tion.., does not address the fact that there cannot be a truly autonomous
and independent adjudicatory body within an agency... (1) the offices are in
the same building; (2) the agency seals are the same; (3) the assignment of
the adjudicator is made by the same agency; (4) the staff and personnel are
hired, promoted, disciplined, and paid by the same agency; and (5) the same
agency approves or disapproves the purchase of the equipment, furniture,
paper, bills, utilities, travel, education, and the like." Ruth, supra note 20, at
237.
134. As discussed throughout, the hearing officer's employment relation-
ship creates inherent problems.
135. In creating procedures, many state agencies appear to copy each
other. The DBR is one of the smaller state agencies. The DBR is, however,
one of the more active agencies in respect to hearings and it serves as a good
example of the typical hearing process employed in other state agencies.
Throughout this section, some of the important similarities or differences be-
tween agencies will be noted.
20041
762 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:735
commercial licensing, racing and athletics, and insurance. 136 Con-
troversies involving the DBR may arise either from a complaint
against a DBR licensee from an outside party, or as a result of a
DBR investigation. 137 If a potential issue comes to light, the DBR
may prosecute on its own. This initial, investigative stage is com-
parable to the actions of a police department in a criminal investi-
gation or a private investigator preparing for a civil lawsuit.
Once a "contested case" develops, the DBR's director appoints
a hearing officer employed by the DBR - usually a member of the
legal staff. 138 A hearing officer is "authorized by law or duly desig-
nated by the Director to hear, conduct and recommend decisions to
the Director in Contested Cases."139 The hearing officer is now in
control of any matters before her.
The next phase involves a "prehearing conference."1 40 In a ju-
dicial proceeding, the trial judge will meet with the parties to "im-
prove the quality of the trial through... preparation" and
"facilitate the settlement of the case." 4 1 Similar to a Rule 16 Con-
ference in a court, the prehearing conference is a semi-formal
meeting, conducted by a hearing officer to present, simplify and
136. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, ABOUT THE AGENCY, http://www.
dbr.state.ri.us/depart-descrip.html (last visited May 12, 2004).
137. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at §§ 3(A-B). An "in-
vestigation" usually originates through the findings of one of the DBR's ex-
aminers through an audit, through the initial licensing process, or as a result
of information provided to the agency by a third-party.
138. Once the hearing officer is appointed, notice is provided to parties in-
volved. For example, if the case of controversy arises from a "Department In-
vestigation," notice shall be in the written form "setting forth specific
allegations, informing Respondent of the intended action or penalty contem-
plated by the Department and advising Respondent of the right to request a
hearing." R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 4(B)(2). If the
DBR requests in its notice, the respondent must answer within 20 days. Id.
This answer may either be an admission or a denial of the accusation - or an
assertion that the "Respondent is without sufficient knowledge or informa-
tion to form a belief with respect to the allegations." Id. This stage is almost
identical to the "pleadings and motions" phase of a civil trial pursuant to Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 7-8.
139. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 2(F).
140. Id. at § 5.
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(4-5). Similarly, a "Prehearing Conference" is
used by the DBR as a "means of making more effective use of hearing time,"
and facilitating settlement negotiations to dispose of the matter if possible.
R.I. DEP'T OF BUs. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 5.
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clarify the issues involved. 142 Although this conference is designed
for similar purposes as its courtroom counterpart, the hearing offi-
cer is not a judge. Scheduling, framing of the issues, and prelimi-
nary motion decisions, therefore, are all subject to the discretion of
an agency employee. 143
The hearing is like a trial, even according to the agencies
themselves: "All Parties, witnesses and other Persons at a hearing
shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the stan-
dards of decorum commonly observed in any courtroom."144 At the
hearing, "Parties shall have the right to present evidence, cross-
examine witnesses, object, make motions and present argu-
ments."145 However, the rules of evidence used during the proceed-
142. Compare R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 5(1),
with FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1). In addition to "simplification or clarification of
the issues," many of the other "Pretrial Conference" considerations apply
equally to the agency's "Prehearing Conference." Compare R.I. DEP'T OF Bus.
REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 5(2-10), with FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2-16).
143. Several elements of the administrative process closely resemble ele-
ments in judicial proceedings. Parties may make motions pursuant to the
Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra
note 108, at § 10(A). Motions may be made either in writing or orally at the
prehearing conference or the hearing. Within ten days, the Party opposing
the motion may request an oral argument of the motion. Any motion must be
accompanied by written memorandum ".. .specifying the legal and factual
basis for the Party's position." Id. at § 10(B). Once the arguments have been
fully presented, the hearing officer - an agency employee - decides the mo-
tion. Like a trial, the hearing process involves discovery. Each of the parties
may request a production of documents from the opposition and also depose
witnesses. Id. at § 11(B) (DBR's rules do not explicitly allow depositions.
However, depositions are allowed and utilized by the prosecuting agency in
many instances.) To comply with discovery, the hearing officer may issue
subpoenas "requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and to com-
pel the production and examination of papers, books, accounts, documents,
records, certificates and other evidence that may be necessary or proper for
the determination and decision of any question before the hearing officer." Id.
at § 12. Additionally the hearing officer may "sua sponte... issue such pro-
tective orders, grant such motions to quash and grant such other motions as
justice or fairness may require." Id. The role played by the hearing officer is
parallel to the position of a judge or magistrate. However, unlike a judge, a
hearing officer lacks the safeguards applicable to the judiciary.
144. Id. at § 14(A); R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 133, at § 12.4 ("All
parties, authorized representatives, witnesses and other persons present at a
hearing shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the standards
of decorum commonly observed in any statewide R.I. court.").
145. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 14(D). The order
of proceedings is similar to a trial, with complainant first presenting his or
her case followed by the respondent.
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ing slightly differ from those of a trial court: "While the rules of
evidence as applied in civil cases in the Superior Courts of this
state shall be followed to the extent practicable, the Hearing Offi-
cer shall not be bound by the technical evidentiary rules."146 In
other words, the hearing officer has more latitude in hearing evi-
dence than a traditional judge, exacerbating the conflicted role of
the hearing officer agency employee. While the decorum and the
procedure of a hearing might be the same as that of a trial, the fa-
tal difference is that the agency employee hearing officer is not a
neutral third-party arbitrator.
After the hearing has been completed, a decision is rendered
pursuant to section 42-35-12 of Rhode Island General Laws.147
This decision is passed on to the director of the DBR who "shall
then enter an order adopting, modifying or rejecting the decision
146. Id. at § 13(A); see also R.I. DEP'T OF ADMIN., supra note 133, at § 8.01
("[AIll relevant and material evidence is admissible which in the opinion of
the Administrator is the best evidence reasonably obtainable, having due re-
gard for its necessity, availability and trustworthiness.").
In contested cases the Rhode Island rules of evidence as applied in
civil cases in the Superior Courts of this state shall govern. Irrele-
vant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded in
all proceedings wherein evidence is taken. (ii) While the Rhode Is-
land Rules of Evidence as applied to civil cases in the Superior
Courts of this state shall be followed to the extent practicable, the
AHO shall not be bound by technical evidentiary rules. Evidence not
otherwise admissible may be admitted, unless precluded by statute,
when necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof
under the rules, if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably
prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. The rules of privilege
recognized by law shall apply.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 133, at § 12.11; R.I. Div. OF TAXATION, supra note
133, at § (8)(c) (using similar language).
147. Section 42-35-12 states:
Any final order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in
writing or stated in the record. Any final order shall include findings
of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if
set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise
and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the find-
ings. If a party, in accordance with agency rules, submitted proposed
findings of fact, the order shall include a ruling upon each proposed
finding. Parties shall be notified either personally or by mail of any
order. Upon request, a copy of the order shall be delivered or mailed
forthwith to each party and to his or her attorney of record.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-12 (2002).
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of the Hearing Officer."148 After director approval, the decision is
delivered to the parties. Any "aggrieved" party may file an appeal
with the Rhode Island Superior Court pursuant to section 42-35-
15 of Rhode Island General Laws.149 However, the scope of an ap-
peal is limited: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact."150 Thus, the factual determination of a hearing officer, an
agency employee, is not subject to a complete judicial review.
Rather, the decision may only be overturned under limited cir-
cumstances. 151 In Rhode Island, the employment relationship be-
tween hearing officer and agency creates the same issues
148. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 15; see also DEP'T
OF ENvTL. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION DIVISION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
§ 16.00(b) ("Every final decision shall be in writing and shall be signed by the
Director. The Director may in his/her discretion, pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 42-
17-7.6, adopt, modify or reject such findings of fact and/or conclusions of law
provided, however, that any such modification or rejection of the proposed
findings of fact or conclusions of law shall be in writing and shall state the
rationale therefore."), http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/released/pdf/DEM/
DEM_851_.pdf (last visited May 3, 2004).
149. R.I. DEP'T OF Bus. REGULATION, supra note 108, at § 18. Section 42-
35-15(a) states:
Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a final
order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this
chapter. This section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judi-
cial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or
trial de novo provided by law. Any preliminary, procedural, or in-
termediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any
case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an
adequate remedy.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(a) (2002).
150. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-15(g) (2002).
151. Id. The court may only reverse an agency decision if "substantial
rights.., have been prejudiced because the administrative findings.., are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(g) (2002).
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concerning fairness and efficiency found in the traditional hearing
process.152
C. The Administrative Hearing Process and the Rhode Island
Judiciary
Despite the inefficiency and unfairness, the Rhode Island
courts have upheld the current system in Kent County Water Au-
thority v. Rhode Island1 3 and La Petite Auberge, Inc. v Rhode Is-
land Commission for Human Rights.154 In Kent County, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held the "hearing officer was not required
to recuse himself from hearing this matter solely because of his
employment with [the Department of Health]."155 The court used a
two part test:
To overcome the presumption in favor of an adjudicator's
honesty and integrity, a party claiming bias or some other
disqualifying factor must adduce evidence that: (1) the
same person(s) involved in building one party's adversar-
ial case is also adjudicating the determinative issues;
and/or (2) other special circumstances render the risk of
unfairness intolerably high. 156
The court "refuse[d] to infer risk of adjudicative bias or impropri-
ety based solely on the Hearing Officer's government-employment
status."157 The court reasoned that "[sluch a contention proves too
much, because.., virtually all administrative adjudications in-
volving governmental entities in this and other jurisdictions would
grind to a halt."158 While a holding to the contrary might have fa-
cilitated a change in the administrative hearing process, it is not
the court's role to change the system of state government. As it
has in other states, the change must come from the legislative and
executive branches; the branches that have the power to imple-
ment a new CHA system.
152. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
153. 723 A.2d 1132 (R.I. 1999).
154. 419 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1980).
155. Kent County, 723 A.2d at 1137.
156. Id. (citing La Petite Auberge, 419 A.2d at 285).
157. Id. at 1137.
158. Id. at 1138.
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In 1980, the court in La Petite Auberge acknowledged the
problem, stating, "The appropriate resolution of investigatory, in-
quisitorial, and adjudicative roles in a single administrative body
has been one of the most problematic features of state and federal
administrative law."159 Again however, the court went on to up-
hold administrative adjudication in its current form, noting, "It
has come to be accepted that the mere existence of a combination
of these functions does not establish the unconstitutionality of the
agency's structure or operations."160 Even though a current system
is constitutional, many states have not accepted the status quo
and have created a CHA in response. 16 Rhode Island should fol-
low suit.
D. A Recommendation for Rhode Island
Rhode Island's administrative adjudication process leaves
much to be desired. Rhode Island faces many of the issues involv-
ing real and perceived unfairness and lack of efficiency that have
been confronted by other states. The economic slowdown over the
past three years has provided an opportunity for the government
to take a closer look at its own processes in search of efficiency
and cost reduction - an example is Governor Carcieri's Fiscal Fit-
ness program.1 62 The Governor and General Assembly should take
advantage of this opportunity to implement a Rhode Island CHA.
This new agency should take an "expanded jurisdiction" ap-
proach, similar to Maryland, requiring most state agencies to use
an independent hearing officer.163 Requiring the use of the CHA
will prevent agencies from strategically withholding certain issues
from the independent hearing officer. 64 Initially, a grace period
allowing agencies to voluntarily use the CHA may help the transi-
159. La Petite Auberge, 419 A.2d at 284 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 51 (1975)).
160. Id.
161. The states that have enacted such a panel since 1980 include Ala-
bama, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Hard-
wicke, supra note 8, at 441-43. Other states are Maryland, North Dakota and
Texas. Hoberg, supra note 2, at 82, 84, 87.
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
163. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
164. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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tion.165 This initial voluntary period would 1) allow agencies to be-
come familiar and more comfortable with the new CHA, and 2)
ease the acrimony caused by a shift in power by helping the agen-
cies realize that an independent decision-maker will allow them to
become more efficient and more effective. 166 Ultimately, however,
because of the potential for abuse and because of Rhode Island's
size, most agencies, if not all, should be required to use the CHA.
The budget for a CHA should be directly allocated by the
General Assembly, rather than from a "revolving fund."167 This
will place all agencies on a more equal footing and cause less
strain between them, because the CHA will not be dependent on
the substantive agencies for its funding. The CHA and the sub-
stantive agencies, even though separated in the decision-making
process, must be interdependent parts of the system as a whole.
The decision of the independent hearing officer should be con-
sidered a strong recommendation to the agency's director. Though
the director retains final approval, he or she will be unlikely to
overturn a decision rendered by a structurally independent third
party.168 Moreover, allowing the director final approval will lessen
the tension caused by a power shift. While some sort of appeal
process within the administrative system might yield a more equi-
table final decision, it appears to be unnecessary. The structural
independence of having a CHA hearing officer who is not under
the supervision and influence of the substantive agency will pro-
duce an equitable result - one in which both the agency and the
public will have faith. 169
CONCLUSION
Many of the concerns and issues that have fueled change in
other states currently plague Rhode Island. Amid the "judicializa-
tion of the administrative process," the role of the hearing officer
165. Tennessee implemented an "intermediate stage of development," to
avoid some conflict and ease the transition. Swent, supra note 58, at 9-10.
Initially, some agency use of the CHA was voluntary. Later, Tennessee's sys-
tem "evolved into a full-fledged central panel with broad, mandatory jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 10.
166. Id.; see also Rich, supra note 11, at 251.
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
168. See discussion supra Part II.B.2; see also Abrams, supra note 4, at
499.
169. Id.
ADMINISTRATIVE INJUSTICE
has expanded and the Rhode Island hearing process must also
evolve. 170 The employment relationship between the hearing offi-
cer and the agency creates several conflicts undermining the cur-
rent system. The solution for Rhode Island is to implement a CHA
with an "expanded" jurisdiction, to provide funding from the gen-
eral fund, and to leave final approval in the hands of the substan-
tive agency's director. As in other states, such an adoption will
lead to a more fair and more efficient process.
As with any change, especially with one involving a shift in
power away from individual state agencies, there will be opposi-
tion and dissent.17' In discussing the difficulty of change, Governor
Carcieri stated:
Change is never easy.... Transforming government will
be a significant challenge. No doubt, there will be road-
blocks along the way. But the time is right to make us
lean and efficient .... For the sake of the next generation
of taxpayers, we must get down to business and deliver a
State government that works for all of its citizens. 72
While change is difficult, creating an unbiased and independent
administrative hearing process will provide a better government
that works for all of its citizens. 73
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